by: Byron Filog Allatog
Moscow and Beijing’s relationship metamorphosed into becoming rational partners to diminish the Western-dominated international system after it opened its doors to the outside world under a shared geopolitical worldview of multipolarity (Stronski and Ng, 2018). China’s market opening to the global economy drove the country’s tremendous economic growth, and today has emerged as an economic powerhouse pushing its role on the world stage. It brought China’s focus on the positioning to build a strong military by its “quest to become a global ‘science and tech superpower’ on a major process to achieve civil-military integration and develop advanced dual-use technologies” (Nouwens and Legarda, 2018). Its mission has pushed the world further into a more complex setting in which emergent phenomena prompted changes in security posture and geopolitical dynamics in some regions. Countries affected by China’s positioning had focused on establishing their security posture by merging tech advancement and security alliances in their national security framework to advance and protect their values and interests. This paper argues that emerging technologies are creating a complex interplay between national security and fundamental rights, posing a challenging issue for the future of intelligence.
Security posture and alliances are changing as critical and emerging technologies facilitate military hype, espionage, foreign interference, and cyber threats. Australia acknowledges the potential and risk posed by emerging technologies as it charts its direction in harnessing critical advanced technology to capacitate impact on its national interests: national security, economic prosperity, and social cohesion (DIST, n.d.). At the core of national security, this paper will engulf intelligence or information as a knowledge (Kent, 2016); its relationship to national security on how intelligence is collected, analyzed and disseminated in the context of the national security intelligence activity (Miller, 2022). The paper’s setting will cover Australia, and the relations will be in the country’s experiences and legal machinery, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, ASIO. Further, the paper will discuss how emerging technologies impact the intelligence cycle at the core of Australian national security and fundamental rights and is organized in the following sequence. First, the emerging technology types and capabilities; second, the intelligence collection in countering espionage and foreign interference; and third, the blurring conditions elevating the myriad of ethical and societal questions it raises—ranging from fundamental rights (privacy) to national security.
The information age embodies technological development’s social and economic transformation in the computing and communications (Degaut, 2016). China’s global push toward a more technologically advanced military is evident, as seen in its “utilization of emerging technologies- artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing to enhance the PLA’s C4ISR capabilities” (Kania and Costello, 2017). With this traction, Australia as a middle power and other world superpowers are investing too. It acknowledges that emerging technologies are enduringly changing the intelligence communities (IC) landscape, including military and law enforcement structures, in countering national security threats linked with emerging technologies. Meanwhile, there are nineteen (19) critical and emerging technologies (CET) that are identified and potentially significant in U.S. national security (The White House, 2022). However, in this section, two aspects of critical emerging technologies-Big Data and Artificial Intelligence are specifically covered. The following clarifies the importance of two emerging technologies concerning Australia: Big data is a broad term referring to overwhelmed data produced daily (Chi, 2017). Also, McCarthy (2004) described “AI as the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs.” AI combines computer science and robust datasets to enable problem-solving (IBM Cloud Education, 2020). In its simplest form, AI is a collection of related techniques and technologies, including machine learning, predictive analytics, natural language processing, and robotics (OVIC, n.d.). Australia underscores the emerging fields and its core to the safety and security of the country, as seen in its effort to boost the CET capability in exploring its standardization by building knowledge locally and regionally to develop an internationally accepted standard (Dunne, 2022).
Big data and AI are the essentials of this paper’s emerging technologies not only it is interlinked “where AI is useless without data, and mastering data is insurmountable without AI” (Maryville University, n.d.). Likewise, it is directly connected with intelligence confronting Australia’s security threat of espionage and foreign interference (ASIO, n.d.). In the age of Big Data, the potential value of open-source information for intelligence (OSINT)-related purposes and other investigative research is widely established; “intelligence work has long relied on a combination of secrets and publicly-available information” (Bunnik et al., 2016). However, with much big data potential, three emerging threats confront Australia. Errey (2022) identified three emerging threats to Australia’s national security and nation-state power: “First, big data can confer a strategic advantage by enabling information dominance and improving kinetic targeting capability — the application of active military force; second, big data enables and “democratizes” targeting and surveillance; third, big data drives information warfare as well as social and political interference.” The political and social interference experienced by Australia in the form of foreign interference was eminent in an unmatched scale of activity against Australia’s interests that explicitly undermined the country’s national security, open system of government, and sovereignty (DHA, n.d.). For example, Australia’s open democratic system of government in advancing research studies was assaulted where research outputs were used to oppress religious and ethnic minorities across China, particularly Xinjiang, in algorithms and app-based surveillance systems (Joske, 2019). A form of targeting and surveillance, a perceived threat to Australia. Likewise, this specific case was an application of the deployment of Information Warfare (IW) in Xinjiang, which demonstrates that China perceives IW as achieving not only deterrent but also preventive or prophylactic effects, whereby IW is seen as an adjunct to more kinetic strategies in conflict (Clarke, 2019). A form of information dominance, a perceived threat to Australia. Furthermore, the development of China’s military technology, particularly on research in supercomputing which was labeled as core to the advancement of combat aircraft and tactical nuclear weapons in the course of collaboration among Australia and Chinese scientists, adds to the attack on the open government system (Pearlman, 2017). On the other hand, AI and machine learning offer great potential as valuable solutions for processing big and live data in government and business sectors. Policing agencies consider AI as a force multiplier that can process large amounts of data in a timely manner and supplement human teams’ efforts in resolving complex analytical problems. (Westendorf, 2022). The pieces of evidence highlight that despite the many potentials in emerging technologies to advance Australia’s interests and way of life, promising risks and threats are upfront impacting intelligence communities and law enforcement’s capabilities to protect Australia.
Having established the triggers, espionage and foreign Interference associated with and enabled by these triggers (AI and Big Data) are Australia’s two active threats today. It is evident in the four laws legislated to deter and counter these national security threats and, as officially claimed by the ASIO chief, a foiled foreign interference (Westcott, 2022). These threats extended to Australian universities, too; data breaches and information theft extended to a high degree. The universities’ talent-recruitment programs in research and science were used as covert actions for data breaches and information theft (APH, n.d.). Searight (2020) settled “that the growing financial dependence of Australian universities on tuition revenue from Chinese students and research funding created a base of support within the upper echelons of academia.” Tracing back, espionage and foreign interference are not new to Australia. ASIO’s origins lie during the Cold War global espionage, which put Soviet spy rings active in Australia. However, the end of the Cold War did not cease using foreign powers’ espionage and foreign interference techniques (ASIO, n.d.). On the contrary to leveraging the existing threats, the big data landscape is changing the future Australian government as it creates new power dynamics between governments, citizens, companies, and nation-states, particularly in national security. According to ASD (n.d.), AI has the potential to provide critical support for intelligence collection in countering espionage and foreign interference. Firstly, AI can help prioritize tasks, allowing people to better address challenges and adapt to complex problems in the face of big data, advanced threats, and adversaries. Secondly, AI-powered computers can offer relevant and timely decision-making support to analysts. Thirdly, machine learning software can detect network data anomalies more effectively than humans due to the vast amount of data involved. Finally, AI can assist in protecting against data theft, ensuring the integrity and availability of both state and individual data.
Meanwhile, as the spycraft counterintelligence endures and potentially thrives lies risk; the ASIO spy chief stated that encryption ‘damages intelligence coverage’ in 97% of ASIO’s priority counterintelligence cases” in Australia (Uren, 2022). Similarly, technological advancement strictly constrained information collection and dominance leveraging activities for the U.S. and other allies in the streets of China and Russia. Both countries increased the use of AI-biometric systems in port checkpoints and secondary screening efforts (Cunliffe, 2021). China’s counterintelligence efforts have employed an AI-aided fingerprint (Reuters, 2017) and an AI-aided facial recognition (NPR, 2021). Similarly, Russia employed both AI biometrics systems (The Moscow Times, 2021). In the world of spies, emerging technologies can be both denying and assuring, significantly revealing a challenging range for the intelligence communities.
Another line of thought in the future of intelligence as technology emerges is that “there has always been a delicate balance between security and privacy concerning intelligence collection” (Pulver and Medina, 2018). AI is evolving and is all around us. It can be used for both noble and immoral. It has many benefits but raises many anxieties and concerns that adversely affect fundamental rights-privacy. For example, in a study made, Rodrigues (2020) argued that “the myriad legal issues affecting human rights principles connected to AI include: data protection, equality, freedoms, human autonomy and self-determination of the individual, human dignity, human safety, informed consent, integrity, justice and equity, non-discrimination, privacy, and self-determination.” Thus, the balance between upholding the fundamental values and securing Australia and its national interest using AI and big data in intelligence is unclear. It is then imperative to examine the potential impact on individuals and society, not solely on privacy-related issues but on biases against groups of individuals and varying fundamental rights (Mantelero, 2018). This conclusion examining the importance of emerging technology’s impact on national security and fundamental rights-privacy as “not solely restricted to privacy-related issues” strikes a balance between the two domains. It is argued that the two are equally essential icons in a democratic country; thus, upholding both is paramount, and not one is trumping the other, as in the case of data collection in OSINT is restricted because of the privacy rule. Etzioni (2015) argued that the state faces legitimate normative and legal claims, and one-sided attention cannot reconcile both intentions; thus, attention to none is an option; striking a balance is argued from this point in the context of “public interest” distinguished from the “common good” as it weighs the core values of both national security and fundamental rights-privacy. Thus, a balance works in conflicting claims of national security and fundamental rights, as the world has evolved with complexities sprouting and persistent.
As has been shown, national security in the context of intelligence will continue to be an uphill challenge as technological tools are continuously emerging. Likewise, a constant engagement with the communities focusing on situation awareness is needed to seal the importance of striking a balance of national security and fundamental rights in the concept of public interest. The reason is that the world has evolved in its nature with the existence of the so-called virtual world, which is technologically connected and powered that never existed decades ago. For Australia, evidence highlights that despite the many potentials of emerging technologies in advancing its interests and way of life, assuring risks and threats are upfront for intelligence communities and law enforcement. In the world of spies, emerging technologies can be both denying and assuring, which significantly reveals a challenging range for the intelligence communities in Australia, and espionage and foreign interference are the prevalent threats. Moreover, keeping Australia safe surmounts a striking balance of national security and fundamental rights to preserve Australia’s way of life, integrity, and security, because fundamental rights are the building blocks of Australian democracy. For the future of intelligence in Australia, IC needs to be robust to adapt to the changing environment filled with emerging technologies.
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Source: csop101.com
